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Perhaps the crowning achievement of mature 
democracies is the peaceful acceptance of the 
ballot box as the primary instrument for decid-
ing who should hold power in society. We do not 
have to go far back in the history of most demo-
cratic states, however, to find a distinct role for 
political violence. Moreover, many inhabitants 
of the globe still remain at risk of falling prey to 
widespread violence in the struggle for political 
office.
Forms of political violence differ a great deal. 
We focus on two important manifestations: 
repression and civil war distinguished by whether 
violence is one-sided or two-sided. Repression is 
one-sided use of violence by the incumbent gov-
ernment to stay in office, effectively repressing 
any latent insurgency by the opposition. Civil 
war is two-sided use of violence by the state as 
well as an insurgent group.1 These two types of 
violence have been studied extensively by politi-
cal scientists and economists, but have typically 
been treated as separate phenomena.2
We present a unified approach to studying 
these forms of political violence with common 
roots in poverty, natural resource rents, and 
weak political institutions. First, we lay out a 
rudimentary model to analyze whether violence 
will occur and, if so, manifest itself as repression 
or civil war.3 Three regimes—peace, repression 
1 We model the motive for insurgency as the desire to 
take over control of the state. This is a significant motive for 
insurgency in practice—see the discussion in James Fearon 
(2008)
2 See Christopher Blattman and Edward Miguel (forth-
coming) for a recent review of the literature on civil con-
flict. Paul Collier and Dominic Rohner (2008) and Benedikt 
Goderis and Mila Versteeg (2008), among others, study 
determinants of state repression.
3 The model and results here are based on Timothy 
Besley and Torsten Persson (2008). The idea of looking at
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and civil war—emerge as alternative equilib-
rium outcomes in the interaction between an 
incumbent government and an opposition group. 
Moreover, the theory suggests a natural order-
ing of these regimes.
We then construct empirical measures of 
repression and civil war, which we map into 
ordered variables as suggested by the theory. 
We investigate how the regime depends on eco-
nomic and political variables, using an ordered 
logit model defined over the three regimes. Our 
estimation results indicate a strong correlation 
between low incomes, weak political institu-
tions and both forms of political violence.
I. Theory and Prediction
There are two groups denoted by J : an incum-
bent government I and an opposition O.4 Each 
group makes up half the population and can 
mobilize a fraction AJ(≤ 1/2) of its citizens as 
members of an army. Let δ J ∈ {0, AJ } denote 
each group’s decision whether to mobilize. 
Modeling this as a discrete choice is a bit artifi-
cial, but helps keep the analysis simple.
A conflict can result in a transition of power 
from the incumbent to the opposition group. 
The probability that the opposition wins office 
is given by the linear conflict technology
  1 __ 
2
+  1 __ μ [δ O − δI ] .
We assume that AI/μ ≤ 1/2 ≤ 1 − AO/1, which 
holds for large enough μ.5 This function entails 
the (non-essential) assumption that in the 
absence of fighting, each group has an equal 
chance of becoming the incumbent.
a wider range of political regimes is also suggested in Jean-
Paul Azam (2005).
4 Besley and Persson (2008) sets up a more general 
model with similar conclusions, but focus on the analysis 
of civil war.
5 If this assumption does not hold—or if the opposition 
has a relative advantage in fighting—the model permits the 
possibility of “unopposed violence” (terrorism), an interest-
ing possibility beyond the scope of this short paper.
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The winning group has access to a fixed 
amount of government revenue denoted by R, 
which we interpret as natural resource rents. (However, this “prize” could relate to any, eco-
nomic or noneconomic, issue determined by 
the incumbent.) But the winner is constrained 
by institutions in distributing the prize. An 
institutionalized sharing rule says that the 
incumbent gets (1 − θ)2R while the opposition 
receives θ2R where θ ∈ [0, 1/2]. With θ = 1/2, 
there is full sharing with each group getting 
its per capita share of revenue while θ = 0 
means that institutional constraints are entirely 
absent. In this sense, higher θ represents better 
institutions.
Each citizen supplies a unit of labor to a mar-
ket earning a real wage of w. The incumbent 
army is financed by a labor tax on all citizens 
so that each group only bears half the cost. In 
contrast, the insurgent army of the opposition 
group is financed exclusively by the opposition 
which thus bears the full per capita cost. This 
is a natural asymmetry, given the incumbent’s 
control of government.
The timing is as follows. First, the opposi-
tion decides whether to mount an insurgency by 
using its army to seize power. Then, the govern-
ment decides whether to use its army, which it 
can do whether or not there is an insurgency. 
These choices and the insurrection technology 
probabilistically determine who is in power. 
Finally, the winner determines the allocation of 
R.
Putting the pieces together, the expected per 
capita payoff of the incumbent group is:
 w a1 −  δI __ 
2
b + a 1 __ 
2
−  1 __ μ [δO − δI  ](1 − 2θ)b 2R.
The first term is the net of tax wage, and the sec-
ond is the expected return from holding office, 
given the (endogenous) expected probability of 
transition. The parallel expression for the oppo-
sition is:
w a1 − δO −  δI __ 
2
b 
  + a 1 __ 
2
+  1 __ μ [δO − δI  ](1 − 2θ)b 2R.
We now look for a sub-game perfect Nash 
equilibrium in the sequential game where the 
opposition moves first. It is straightforward to 
identify three possible equilibria:
Peace: δI = δO = 0, which occurs if 4R(1 − 2θ)/w ≤ μ.
Repression: δI = AI and δO = 0, which occurs if 
2R(1 − 2θ)/w ≤ μ < 4R(1 − 2θ)/w.
Civil war: δI = AI and δO = AO, which occurs if μ < 2R(1 − 2θ)/w.
In peace, neither group chooses to fight. Under 
repression, the government uses its army to stay 
in power. Under civil war, both groups use their 
armies.
A crucial determinant of the equilibrium is 
the value of 2R(1 − 2θ)/w, the ratio of the prize 
captured by the winner and the real wage. The 
greater the natural resource rents at stake (R), 
the greater the likelihood of a violent outcome. 
This is also true if wages (w), and hence the 
opportunity cost of fighting, are lower. For inclu-
sive enough political institutions (θ close enough 
1/2), the outcome will be peaceful. Middling 
values (all else equal) imply repression, whereas 
very non-inclusive institutions more likely spurn 
two-sided conflict. Finally, political violence is 
less likely when it is less effective in bringing 
about a change in power (a high value of μ). 
We expect all these parameters to vary across 
countries and time in response to economic and 
political circumstances.
Repression becomes a real possibility because 
of the asymmetry in government control. The 
government can use the whole tax base to 
finance the formal army making it cheaper to use 
violence. In other words, the classic Weberian 
monopoly of violence, derived here from 
monopoly access to taxation, opens the door to 
government repression of the opposition.
How can we approach the data in light of the 
model? To fix ideas, suppose we observe prox-
ies for variables R, w and θ across countries and 
time, but do not observe μ. We also observe if a 
particular country is in repression or civil war 
in a particular year. Let μ be distributed across 
countries and time according to some distribution 
with c.d.f. F( ∙ ). Then the expressions defining 
equilibrium imply that the probability of observ-
ing civil war is F(2R(1 − 2θ)/w), the probability 
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of observing repression is F(4R(1 − 2θ)/w) − 
F(2R(1 − 2θ)/w), while the probability of 
observing peace is 1 − F(2R(1 − 2θ)/w). This 
immediately suggests that we may estimate an 
ordered logit (or probit) to gauge how the vari-
ables identified by the model affect the relative 
probabilities of the three regimes.
II. Data and Estimation
Before presenting our estimation results, we 
discuss how to measure the three ordered states 
and the empirical determinants suggested by the 
model.
A. Measuring Repression and Civil War
A large body of literature looks at the deter-
minants of civil war.6 In this paper, we use a 
variable from the Correlates of War (COW) data 
set, which provides annual data on conflicts (from 1816) up to 1997. The COW intrastatewar 
indicator takes a value of one if a given country 
in a given year is involved in a violent conflict 
which claims a (cumulated) death toll of more 
than 1,000 people. We remove conflicts that 
involve interventions by another state and do not 
consider extra-systemic wars.
To measure repression, we use data from two 
independent sources. The first source is the data 
on human rights violations in Mark Gibney, 
Linda Cornett and Reed Wood (2007). These 
are collected by two organizations, the US State 
Department and Amnesty International, and are 
available from 1976 onwards. Each series has 
a political terror scale ranked from 1 to 5. We 
take the maximum value of the two series in any 
given country and year and use a cutoff of 3 and 
above to classify it as repression. This implies 
that civil and political rights violations such as 
execution, imprisonment and political murders/
brutality are widespread. In the worst cases, 
leaders of society place no limit on the means 
or thoroughness with which they pursue per-
sonal or ideological goals. For the period 1976 
to 2006, around 32 percent of all country years 
are classified as being in repression. Not surpris-
ingly, many of these coincide with civil war.
6 There are a number of issues involved in the coding 
of conflicts into civil wars. See Nicholas Sambanis (2004) 
for a thorough discussion about different definitions that 
appear in the empirical literature.
To construct the ordered variable suggested by 
the theory, we set a value of zero when there is 
neither repression nor civil war, one when there 
is repression, but no civil war, and two when 
there is civil war, whether there is repression or 
not. We focus on the 21 years of data for which 
we have measures of both civil war incidence 
and repression. Given our classification rules, 
81 percent of our sample has peace, 8 percent 
repression, and 11 percent civil war.
Our second ordered variable is derived from 
a measure of repression in Arthur Banks (2005), 
which counts up purges: systematic murders 
and eliminations of political opponents within 
regimes. We create an indicator equal to one 
in any year when purges exceed zero. Here, we 
use the data from 1962 onward in our ordered 
logits. Over the period 1962–2005, on average 6 
percent of country-years are classified as being 
in repression—the Banks measure is thus much 
more conservative than the Gibney et al. mea-
sure. Also, purges seem rarely to coincide with 
civil war.
Is there a natural ordering across the three 
states as in our theory? For income per capita, 
the answer is a clear-cut yes. According to the 
Gibney et al. measure, peaceful countries have 
an average GDP per capita of $6,500, repressing 
countries are considerably poorer with $3,200, 
while the countries in civil war are the poorest 
with average incomes of $2,000. A similar pat-
tern is seen for the Banks measure.
The regularity across political regimes is 
equally clearcut. Here, we use parliamentary 
democracy as our institutional measure to cor-
respond to θ in the theory. By the Gibney et al. 
measure, 35 percent of peaceful countries, 16 
percent of repressing countries, and 9 percent of 
civil-war countries are in parliamentary democ-
racy. Again, the ordering is consistent with the 
theory. A similar pattern again emerges for the 
Banks measure.
Both of these findings hint at the validity of 
thinking of peace, repression and civil war as 
ordered states featuring different levels of politi-
cal violence.
B. Determinants of Repression and Civil War
Tables 1A and 1B explore some evidence 
from alternative ordered logit models. For each 
of our two ordered left-hand side variables, we 
use three specifications. In the first, we include 
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the log of GDP, an indicator for parliamentary 
democracy, and dummy variables measur-
ing whether a country is a large exporter of 
oil or primary products. As a source of exog-
enous time variation in income, we use data on 
natural disasters from the EM-DAT data set. 
Specifically, we construct an indicator that adds 
together the number of floods and heat waves in 
a given country and year, assuming that both act 
as a negative shock to real incomes. The second 
specification adds a set of year dummies to con-
trol for trending variables. The third specifica-
tion follows Besley and Persson (2008), adding 
price indexes for primary exports and imports 
and oil import and export prices. These are 
arguably good exogenous measures of (positive) 
shocks to resource rents and (negative) shocks 
to real incomes.
Columns 1–3 of Table 1A display results 
for our ordered variable based on Gibney et 
al. (2007). The estimated coefficients are 
reported as odds ratios, with a ratio above (below) one corresponding to a positive (nega-
tive)  nontransformed coefficient. Column 1 
shows that higher GDP per capita reduces the 
probability of repression and civil war, while 
the same is true if a country is a parliamen-
tary democracy (the significance levels refer 
to an odds ratio significantly different from 
one, i.e., a negative coefficient). Large primary 
products exporters tend to have lower chances 
of being in repression or conflict, while being 
a large oil exporter does not systematically 
affect political violence. Our weather shock 
variable also predicts a significant increase in 
the probability of being in repression or civil 
war. Column 2 shows that these results hold 
up when we include year dummy variables. 
Column 3 shows that there is a positive corre-
lation between the likelihood of political vio-
lence and commodity export prices as well as 
oil import prices.
Table 1A—Ordering Logit Estimates of Determinants of Peace, Repression 
and Civil War
(1) (2) (3)
Log GDP 0.668*** 0.652*** 0.660***
(7.85) (7.56) (6.81)
Parliamentary democracy 0.401*** 0.345*** 0.316***
(6.98) (7.84) (7.88)
Large oil exporter 1.102 1.269 1.081
(0.63) (1.43) (0.41)
Large primary exporter 0.644*** 0.572*** 0.377***
(3.97) (4.66) (6.80)
Weather shock 1.186*** 1.420*** 1.399***
(3.88) (8.32) (7.66)
Export price index 1.106***
(3.24)
Import price index 0.206**
(2.52)
Oil export prices 1.008
(0.46)
Oil import prices 1.394***
(7.68)
Year dummy variables No Yes Yes
Observations 1,993 1,993 1,878
Notes: The dependent variable is constructed from the COW and Gibney et al. (2007) as 
described in the text. Sources for other variables as described in Besley and Persson (2008). 
All columns are estimated using an ordered logit. The reported coefficients are odds ratios with 
robust z-statistics in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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In columns 1–3 of Table 1B, we repeat the 
same exercise for the ordered variable based on 
Banks (2005). The findings for income per cap-
ita, parliamentary democracy, primary exporter 
status and weather shocks are all very similar. 
But the results are different for the price indexes. 
Now, commodity export and import prices are 
both significant in the expected direction, as are 
oil export prices.
Overall, the findings are consistent with the 
prediction that economic shocks are impor-
tant determinants of repression and civil war. 
Moreover, more inclusive political institutions as 
measured by parliamentary democracy signifi-
cantly reduce the prospect of political violence.
III. Concluding Comments
This paper contributes to the debate about the 
nature of political equilibrium in poor countries 
with weakly institutionalized polities where the 
use of political violence can be endemic. We 
argue that it is useful to think about repression 
and civil conflict in a unified way and develop 
a simple model to illustrate this argument. Our 
approach recognizes three states, and we discuss 
how this helps us think about measurement of 
political outcomes. Finally, the data support the 
idea that there is indeed an ordering—with peace, 
repression and conflict as the three states.
In our view, it is valuable to study conflict 
from the stepping stone of a well-articulated 
theoretical model. Such an approach holds out 
the hope that we may better integrate our under-
standing of conflict with other issues in political 
economy—in particular the character of govern-
ment in non-conflict situations. Clearly, much 
remains to do, in order to bridge the gap between 
theory and data in this area. The ultimate goal 
is to map political and economic circumstances 
into our wider understanding of the forces that 
shape economic and political development. This 




Log GDP 0.631*** 0.630*** 0.626***
(8.37) (8.24) (7.97)
Parliamentary democracy 0.578*** 0.554*** 0.580***
(3.36) (3.72) (3.39)
Large oil exporter 1.200 1.314* 1.205
(1.13) (1.67) (1.06)
Large primary exporter 0.284*** 0.284*** 0.195***
(7.30) (7.30) (7.26)
Weather shock 1.124*** 1.250*** 1.275***
(2.78) (4.69) (4.93)
Export price index 1.172***
(3.83)
Import price index 1.413
(0.82)
Oil export prices 1.030***
(3.33)
Oil import prices 1.198***
(2.59)
Year dummy variables No Yes Yes
Observations 3,549 3,549 3,394
Notes: The dependent variable is constructed from the COW and from the purges data in Banks 
(2005) as described in the text. Sources for other variables as described in Besley and Persson 
(2008). All columns are estimated using an ordered logit.  The reported coefficients are odds 
ratios with robust z-statistics in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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